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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REFLECTIONS ON SUBSTANCE AND FORM IN THE CIVIL
RIGHTS CLASSROOM

DONI GEWIRTZMAN*
AUTHOR’S NOTE
Last year, I taught Sexuality and the Law for the first time. While teaching
the course, I observed a wide disparity between my students’ high level of
interest and enthusiasm for the course and my own response to what was
happening in the classroom. I found myself frustrated and unhappy, not with
the students or their performance, but with the decisions I made about how we
spent our time. The choices I made were bad ones, and I am no doubt guilty of
many of the pedagogical sins that are cataloged in the pages that follow.
This Essay is an effort to work through the reasons why I made those
choices, and how I might avoid making the same mistakes twice. In reflecting
upon the experience, I have found it helpful to generalize, exaggerate, and
overstate what “typical” law professors do in their classrooms. It is my hope
that this admittedly distorted and broad-brush approach will—like a
magnifying glass—make the nature of certain pedagogical choices more
transparent, and highlight the larger value commitments that are at stake when
we make decisions about how to teach. It is in no way intended to denigrate
the many innovative teachers among our ranks, or to ignore the nuanced and
varied approaches those teachers have adopted.
INTRODUCTION
In an ideal universe, there is a direct, holistic relationship between what we
teach and how we teach—between substance and form. When substance and
form align, our pedagogy reflects, models, and creates an experiential
manifestation of the subject matter’s core components and central conflicts. In

* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. I owe much of the thinking in this Essay
to some of the great teachers in my life, including George Creeger, Peggy Cooper Davis, John
Dwyer, John Finn, Liz Gewirtzman, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Linda Messing, and Anna Morello.
Each of them set standards I aspire to meet every day and made me think long and hard about
how I teach. I am also indebted to Gerry Korngold, the members of the New York Law School
Junior Faculty Colloquium, particularly Rebecca Roiphe, James Grimmelmann, and Molly Land,
and the editors at the Saint Louis University Law Journal for their comments on this Essay.
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this perfected vision of the classroom, the essence of what we teach is
embodied by how we teach, and the decisions we make about how we teach
reflect substantive judgments about law, our legal system, and the nature of the
profession itself.
Yet all too often, legal education treats substance and form as distant
cousins. The formal components of classroom teaching remain largely the
same, regardless of the subject under review. In the day-to-day, give-and-take
of the classroom, a contracts class looks like a torts class, and a torts class runs
the same way as a constitutional law course. The answers to the questions
“how to teach constitutional law” or “how to teach torts” focus on adding or
subtracting cases from a casebook, emphasizing or deemphasizing particular
historical developments, or advocating the adoption of a grand unified theory
that unites disparate subject matter.
This turns course design into a question of substance rather than form. The
result is limited pedagogical variance from class to class, professor to
professor, or institution to institution. True experimentation and innovation are
absent, and plain vanilla remains the perpetual entrée du jour.
In order to create true alignment between substance and form, we must ask
what is at the heart of our substance, which is no easy question given the broad
and undefined category of “civil rights.” Beyond providing familiarity with a
laundry list of canonical cases, statutes, and constitutional provisions, what
core substantive conflicts are acted out through the drama of the classroom?
Within the civil rights arena, I came to think about the meta-substance of
my course as three interrelated dualistic conflicts that not only appear
repeatedly throughout the doctrine, but are inherent to the very nature of what
law is and what clients seek to resolve through our legal system. These
conflicts are: the battle between coercion and freedom,1 the battle between
“public and private,”2 and the battle between “law and love.”3
All three conflicts are inevitable given the ways in which any legal regime
achieves dominance and perpetuates itself. First, law—as a cultural practice—
requires some form of coercion to maintain its power and legitimacy, often
using compliance techniques that restrict and devalue freedom. Second, law
inevitably imposes itself into the private sphere, bringing external public norms
into relationships and places where its presence may be unfamiliar and
unwelcome. Finally, law creates categories of people and things and allocates

1. See generally PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos
trans., 1993) (1970).
2. See BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF
FREEDOM 16 (1994).
3. PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RESTRUCTURING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 121 (1999).
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them into a hierarchy, bringing the finalized legal regime into tension with the
unbounded and egalitarian nature of universal love.4
Just as inevitably, the core dramatic conflicts that take place within the
classroom replicate the substantive tensions behind what we teach. In this
way, the civil rights classroom—whether we like it or not—serves as a space
for “acting out” each of these three battles. Through their in-class behaviors,
professor and student alike are engaged in acts of coercion and liberation,
pushing at or reinforcing the boundaries between public and private, and
managing the tensions between law and love.
In the civil rights context, the gap between substance and form is
particularly stark. In terms of form, the standard law school classroom
reinforces each of the three dualities and takes a clear stand in favor of one side
or the other: it sides with coercion against freedom, maintains a rigid boundary
between public and private, and polarizes the divide between law and love.
These ever-present realities present challenges for aligning substance and form
in a civil rights course, where the substance is often related to exposing,
questioning, and undermining the ideologies reinforced by our signature
pedagogical approach.
This Essay, building on observations by critical education and legal
theorists like Paulo Friere, Duncan Kennedy, Robert Cover, Paul Kahn, bell
hooks, and others, is an effort to make the disconnect between substance and
form more explicit. Rather than serving as a “how-to” manual for teaching a
civil rights course, it suggests that any answer to the question “how to teach
civil rights” should inquire into each of the three core conflicts that constitute
the underlying meta-substance of the course. In turn, these substantive
struggles require the civil rights professor to revisit many of the deeply
ingrained formal habits of law school teaching, towards the eventual goal of
creating synergy between substance and form.
I. THE BATTLE BETWEEN COERCION AND FREEDOM
The law school classroom is a fearful and angry place. Most of the fear
and anger is not on full display, but it is there, lurking under the surface, being
silently channeled back and forth between professor and student.
The fear and anger derives from what the Carnegie Report refers to as legal
education’s “signature pedagogy”: the case dialogue.5 As the Carnegie Report
describes it, the case dialogue is a largely teacher-centered exercise, where the
professor “is clearly the focal point” and where “it is relatively rare . . . for
students to address one another directly.”6 All knowledge is mediated through
4. See id. at 121–22.
5. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 23–24 (2007).
6. Id. at 49–50.
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a single figure that sits atop a hierarchy, a hierarchy that replicates, as Duncan
Kennedy noted, “relations between junior associates and senior partners . . .
between lawyers and judges.”7 We see professors, in bell hooks’ words, who
are “enthralled by the exercise of power and authority within their minikingdom, the classroom.”8
In its current form, our signature pedagogy, detached as it is from the
nature of the subject matter, provides our students with one reliable point of
confluence between substance and form: a first-hand, ringside-seat encounter
with the coercive power of law. The professor controls the discussion through
an elaborately scripted Socratic or quasi-Socratic dialogue. Questions are
asked, for which there is a desired response, and if the response is not given,
the professor finds a way—either through reinterpreting the student’s comment
or calling on another student—to get the answer she wants. As anyone who
has written a standard-issue syllabus or lesson plan knows, there is very limited
room for movement or departure from the lesson plan itself, virtually no room
for debate about the content of the course, the structure of the discussion, the
method of evaluation, or much of anything else. There is next to no chance
that the class itself will construct new knowledge—most of the time, classroom
discussion consists of the arguments outlined in majority or dissenting
opinions restated in a more accessible way (i.e. reading comprehension), or to
bring forth an underlying academic theory advanced by the professor or
already articulated by another expert. Because all knowledge is mediated
through the professor, there is virtually no opportunity for students to surpass
the professor in their mastery of the material or in their analytic capabilities.
Most speech, other than the professor’s, operates in a highly regulated
environment. All rules about the classroom are sent down as dictates from on
high, with the professor at the top of a clearly defined hierarchy that makes it
evident, at every available opportunity, who is in charge.9 It is not a model of
democratic governance. It is not a model for, to use educational theorist Paulo
Friere’s word, “liberation.”10
Instead, the pedagogy models the coercive power of law, where our actions
are manipulated—consciously or unconsciously—in ways that restrain
individuality and self-expression. And like most populations that are subjected
to the coercive power of law, it generates anger and fear in those that are at the
bottom of the totem pole.

7. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 77 (2004). Kennedy’s essay contains many of the core concepts
identified in this section, though his terminology is somewhat different.
8. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 17.
9. FREIRE, supra note 1, at 73.
10. Id. at 70.
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The anger and fear exist from the teacher’s vantage point as well. The
subconscious fantasy on the professor’s end is that the classroom will become
“not law.” It will descend into anarchy, or revolution, or some other form of
social chaos that exposes the undeniable fact that there are one hundred ten
students, and only one professor.11 Moreover, those students pay the
professor’s salary, and may—in a moment of sudden self-realization—decide
that they are entitled to some degree of power as a result. It is the same fear
that most despots encounter throughout their reign. And the professor, like
most dictators (both benevolent and malevolent), responds by using the
coercive power of law to full effect: imposing themselves at the top of a rigid
classroom hierarchy, constraining the exchange of knowledge between
members of the classroom community, conducting an evaluation process that
lacks transparency or an effective means of appeal, and ruling by fiat.
This serves some purpose in professional training. As Duncan Kennedy
observed, compliance with rules, a respect for institutions, and a willingness to
operate within hierarchical structures are essential components of what it
means to be a legal professional in contemporary America.12 In this way, the
pedagogy does indeed unite substance and form by inculcating compliance
with law’s coercive power as a professional value, though usually without the
critical awareness, transparency, or experiential components necessary for
professors or students to fully internalize its benefits or question the costs of
law’s regime.
By contrast, the substance of civil rights law presents the relationship
between coercion and freedom as far more complex and mutually dependent.
On one hand, the corpus of modern civil rights law developed as a direct and
antagonistic response to law’s coercive power. The Civil Rights Act of 1964,13
the Voting Rights Act,14 the Americans with Disabilities Act,15 and countless
other federal, state, and local civil rights statutes are the products of social
movement activism that, at one point, mobilized under the banner of freedom
against the detrimental effects of law’s coercive power on particular
communities.16
Yet, once each social movement achieved mainstream acceptance, law—as
embodied by statutory reform and enforcement practices—was the primary

11. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 188 (“Fear of losing control in the classroom often leads
individual professors to fall into a conventional teaching pattern wherein power is used
destructively.”)
12. KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 71.
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
15. Id. § 12101.
16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on the
Development of Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002).
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vehicle for these movements to memorialize and consolidate their gains. As
Paul Kahn noted, “Revolution is thus the source and underlying truth of law.”17
Each social movement, as it gained acceptance, enshrined its vision of the
world by relying on law’s coercive capacity to achieve a radically different set
of social goals.
Hence, ambivalence about law’s relationship to coercion and freedom is
built into the substance of the course. Civil rights law has a rich history of
questioning the utility and moral justification for legally enforced power
structures, while nevertheless adopting legal means to achieve different ends.
It is a complexity that is missing in the design of our signature pedagogy,
creating a wide chasm between the nuance of the subject matter and the brute
coercion of our form.
In my classroom, the substance–form divide between coercion and
freedom manifested itself on a daily basis. While the substance reflected cases
about lesbians and gay men who, at deep personal cost, bravely challenged
power structures and social expectations, my pedagogical form provided no
opportunities for that courage to manifest itself in the classroom environment.
The management of classroom discussions was strictly top-down, as I
unilaterally imposed content, guided discussion towards personal areas of
interest, and restated student comments so that they aligned with my own goals
for the course. The result was a personal sense of despair after each class,
brought about by the feeling that my teaching practice was reinforcing
precisely the sort of social hierarchies that were challenged in the cases we
read. There was no room for revolution.
Hierarchies themselves are not necessarily bad. They enable individuals to
coordinate behavior, minimize conflict, specialize skills, discourage the
shirking of responsibility, motivate individuals to perform, and make their
behavior more efficient. And there are good reasons for some hierarchy within
a classroom—the professor’s superior level of expertise, the efficiencies of
allowing one person to make quick and authoritative decisions, and a culture of
expectations among law students that often craves hierarchy in its most 1L,
Paper Chase-like manifestations.
Yet the hierarchical form of my classroom seemed ill matched to the
substance of the class. The next time I teach the course, I plan to explore ways
to give students greater control over the class agenda by creating opportunities
for student-led discussions, group projects, and other mechanisms designed to
foster greater autonomy and ownership over the classroom experience.
Coercion, whether explicit or implicit, cannot function as the primary
pedagogical dynamic in a civil rights classroom.

17. KAHN, supra note 3, at 120–21.
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II. THE BATTLE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
Our signature pedagogy maintains a rigid boundary between public and
private.18 The private lived experience of students is suppressed and treated as
not only irrelevant, but an inappropriate distraction from the important public
work of the classroom. The case-based nature of the classroom inquiry, which
calls upon students to exclude so much of human experience as irrelevant in
the search for “material facts,” depersonalizes the rich and diverse nature of
human experience into a set of archetypal case narratives for public
consumption.19 And it provides virtually no opportunity to systematically
reflect on how the law affects the aspects of the self that are essential to who
we are but often defy our efforts to translate them into the language of the law
school classroom: our sense of right and wrong, our racial or sexual identity, or
the challenging interpersonal dilemmas that arise out of even the most
mundane professional interactions. The result is a private self that is
disintegrated from and suppressed by a public professional identity, and a
classroom environment that excludes so much of how we make sense of our
jobs and the external world.
As with coercion and freedom, the professor’s desire to maintain a clear
line between public and private serves some valuable professional training
objectives. Lawyers are valued for their ability to suppress their own private
desires in the service of a client’s needs, as well as their ability to exercise
independent professional judgment that is untainted by emotions or other
judgment-distorting elements of the private self.
Yet this bright-line divide between public and private is particularly out of
place in the civil rights classroom. In part, this is because students often take
the course in order to bridge the gap between public and private, to make sense
of their own private experience as existing within or outside a socially salient
category like race or sexuality, and to directly address the ways that a public
legal regime impacts the construction of their private self.
And in part, it is because the pedagogical approach fails to reflect the
complexity with which civil rights law has addressed the substantive line
between public and private. On one hand, much of civil rights law has been
designed to take areas of human interaction that were once deemed private and
make them public. Prior to the development of statutory remedies for civil
rights violations, the early civil rights constitutional “canon” was built around

18. See HOOKS, supra note 2, at 16.
19. Leah Ward Sears, formerly of the Supreme Court of Georgia, provides an excellent
example of this need to recognize human experience over rigid law in a dissent arguing for a
broader understanding of adoption in inheritance cases. O’Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 439, 492–
94 (1994) (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting) (majority upholding Georgia law requiring legal adoption
and denying potential inheritance rights on the basis of equitable adoption).
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cases defining the scope of state action doctrine20 and establishing a rigid
dichotomy between the political (i.e. public) sphere, which was deemed
appropriate for legal regulation, and the social (i.e. private) sphere, which was
considered off-limits.21 Much of civil rights reform has been dedicated to
questioning, challenging, and supplanting this dichotomy by broadening the
spaces in which public constitutional norms may apply and through statutory
reforms that have taken areas that were once considered matters of private
choice (i.e. the ability of private actors to discriminate) and subjecting them to
public norms. It is no surprise, therefore, that the social movements that drove
civil rights reform originated in acts of consciousness-raising, where
participants drew on personal testimonials and other forms of self-expression
to consider the ways that public life infiltrates and distorts the private self.
In other areas, civil rights reform has taken spheres of social engagement
that were once public and made them private. In courses like Sexuality and the
Law, the public/private distinction infiltrates virtually every area of the course,
as the class explores whether and why an individual’s choice of sexual
partners, the decision to engage in a particular sex act, or to choose a particular
family structure is a legitimate matter for public concern.
The marriage of substance and form asks the civil rights teacher to reflect
on the division between public and private in the classroom itself. After all,
how can we fully engage the boundary between what is public and what is
private when those boundaries are so rigidly maintained in practice by our
signature pedagogy? The civil rights classroom environment is fertile ground
for working through law’s unresolved and ambivalent relationship with these
issues, as students make deliberate decisions about what aspects of their lives
they wish to share with the rest of the class, the degree to which their lived
experience ought to be subject to public scrutiny, and which aspects they
choose to remain private. The same questions confront the professor as well,
who must reconcile dueling obligations: to model the sort of vulnerability and
personal reflection that makes the potential for self-actualization and
professional satisfaction that much more possible, or to model the sort of
professional distance between public and private that facilitates legal
judgment.
My classroom, like most, rigidly maintained the boundary between public
and private. As a result, a course that should have drawn rich links between
individual experience and legal rules and structures adopted the impersonal
approach of an antitrust seminar. And while I was certainly “out” as a gay
man, the specific dynamics within my own private life that led me to teach the
course remained closeted and suppressed. The next time I teach the course, I
plan to be a little braver, allowing myself to speak more from personal
20. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
21. See, eg., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010] REFLECTIONS ON SUBSTANCE AND FORM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLASSROOM

791

experience, but also to encourage students to draw explicit links between the
course substance and their own lives. This becomes particularly challenging in
a sexuality course, where generational distinctions between professor and
student are often stark. Today’s law students often have a very different
relationship with “coming out” than their professors. They may think about
gay identity in different ways, their relationship with their families may be
very different, and their perceptions about the ways that homophobia affects
their lives may also be different. A course that maintains a rigid boundary
between public and private suppresses these differences, and in turn, stifles
intellectual exchanges that would ultimately serve the goals of the course.
This is not to suggest a “right answer” for balancing the competing
demands of public and private, or to advocate for a classroom environment that
resembles a confessional booth or a therapist’s couch. For now, it is simply
enough to ask civil rights professors to interrogate the status quo of our
signature pedagogy, and to welcome opportunities for professor and student
alike to situate their respective experiences within the substantive context of
the classroom.
III. THE BATTLE BETWEEN LAW AND LOVE
In his book The Cultural Study of Law, Paul Kahn casts law and love in
opposition to one another. While law is based in rationality, category-based
hierarchies, and “division and distinction,”22 the ideal of love—in the John
Lennon “Imagine” sense of the word—is based in emotion and equality, and
seeks to advance “the abolition of borders and the common community of
mankind.”23
The process by which law achieves supremacy over love has at least two
features, both of which are replicated within the law school classroom. First,
law’s dominance occurs, as Robert Cover observed, through a “jurispathic”
process in which alternative legal interpretations are systematically suppressed,
struck down, or dismissed.24 As Cover points out, there is a violent aspect to
this interpretive winnowing process, as law’s coercive features are invoked to
elevate certain interpretive perspectives while striking down competing
versions of legal meaning.25
In practice, our signature pedagogy shares this pathology. Students
generate alternative visions of legal regimes all the time. One by one, either
from the professor’s mouth or through student dialogue that is solicited or
manipulated by the professor, these alternative visions—often driven by

22. KAHN, supra note 3, at 121.
23. Id. at 122.
24. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV L. REV. 4, 40 (1983).
25. Id.
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emotion, morality, or amorphous concerns about justice—are struck down as
irrational. Or unrealistic. Or off-topic. In this way, the signature pedagogy
leaves a sense of alienation and dissociation in its wake, as law becomes
detached from internal value commitments that pre-date law’s intrusion into
our individual consciousness. The law school classroom—imbued with the
jurispathic characteristics of law itself—is where dreams come to die. It is
where hot air balloons run out of steam, and begin the long, steep descent back
to earth.
Second, law attains its superiority over love by exalting its rational
components, situating itself as the vehicle by which logic triumphs over the
emotions and thereby constraining “the emotionality of the behavior that gives
rise to legal disputes.”26 While love is the realm of the intuitive, the unruly,
and the unpredictable, law promotes order, stability, cognition, and
consistency.
Our signature pedagogy replicates law’s triumph over love. The law
school classroom operates to suppress emotion and intuition by systematically
devaluing comments tinged with feelings while granting exalted status to the
cognitive and rational realm. The professor maintains a monopoly on emotive
content through a relentless focus on getting students to “think like lawyers”
and the egocentric theatrics of the classroom performance.
The result of law’s triumph over love in the classroom is an environment
where students are deprived of both feeling and a sense of possibility and
imagination. While this process has significant value for professional
training—legal discourse demands a particular type of performance from its
practitioners and, at times, must distance itself from emotion to maintain its
legitimacy—it creates a schism in our students, one in which professional
identities become completely separated from an emotional sense of self.
Moreover, it results in lawyers who are ill-equipped to manage the emotional
content of their interactions with colleagues and clients, precisely because the
bulk of their professional training—unlike a growing number of business and
medical schools27—ignores the interpersonal dynamics at the heart of any
professional relationship.
In contrast to the law school classroom, civil rights law has never been
content to allow law and love to exist in separate spheres. Perhaps more than
any other area of law, civil rights law has embraced love’s potential by
bridging gaps between emotion and rationality and setting forward an “I Have
a Dream” narrative ideal of a fully inclusive social structure without
categories, boundaries, or hierarchies. It has been built on an ability to idealize

26. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW
309, 309 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999).
27. See, e.g., MOHAMMADREZA HOJAT, EMPATHY IN PATIENT CARE: ANTECEDENTS,
DEVELOPMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND OUTCOMES 4 (2007).
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and imagine different utopias and better versions of the world we live in. It
has challenged existing categorizations and boundaries between people, and
sought ways to legalize alternative and more inclusive social structures.
Moreover, emotions and feelings have always been a driving force behind
the development of civil rights law, and emotional content has often been a
transparent part of interpretation. From Selma to Stonewall, social movements
have long used emotional triggers by inducing shame, compassion, empathy,
guilt, and pride to motivate legal change.28 As a result, it is no surprise that
emotional content has become a part of civil rights jurisprudence, from the
Casey joint opinion’s “sweet-mystery-of-life” passage29 to Justice Kennedy’s
references to the “transcendent” link between liberty and sexual intimacy in
Lawrence.30
Emotions were kept on limited display and a tight leash in my classroom.
Statements by students that began “I feel” were often met with eye-rolls from
their peers, and I often responded by moving the student towards more familiar
ground. The result was a disconnect between subject matter that provoked
deep emotional responses that were closely tied to moral development, and a
classroom environment that suppressed emotional expression by valuing
cognition über alles. At the very least, my next effort to teach the course will
openly interrogate the appropriate role of emotion in a law school classroom
and try to create space for feelings and thinking to coexist.
CONCLUSION
It is little wonder that many law students experience our signature
pedagogy as deeply wounding to their sense of self. It is, after all, a process
that—in its most pure manifestations—replicates the more coercive and
jurispathic aspects of law itself.
In her book Teaching to Transgress, bell hooks describes teaching as a
healing profession.31 Given the nature of its substance, there is no better place
than the civil rights classroom to heal the wounds created by the way we teach.
We can bridge the gap between coercion and freedom by deliberately altering
the power dynamic in the classroom. We can engage the distinction between
public and private by providing opportunities to situate the lived experience of
both professor and student within the subject matter of the course. And we can
offer a vision of the world where law and love coexist by imagining alternative
futures and finding a place for emotional content.

28. See Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination
in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 676 (2009).
29. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
31. HOOKS, supra note 2, at 14–16.
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Let me be clear: a law school classroom is neither a Montessori school nor
a Pete Seeger concert. It is—and should be—a venue for students to learn law,
the inculcation of shared cultural norms, and the development of sound
professional judgment.
At the same time, it is impossible to teach civil rights law without
maintaining a critical eye towards the sets of rules, structures, and practices
that create hierarchies within a society. True synergy between substance and
form requires applying that same critical eye to the drama of the classroom,
and seeking out opportunities for student and professor alike to experience the
ambivalence and confusion that lies between each of these stark dualities.
Much as the substance of civil rights doctrine has served as a corrective for
law’s more extreme manifestations, the civil rights classroom ought to serve as
a corrective for the more extreme manifestations of our pedagogical form.

